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ABSTRACT
e quantity of mobility data is overwhelming nowadays provid-
ing tremendous potential for various value-added services. While
the benets of these mobility datasets are apparent, they also pro-
vide signicant threat to location privacy. Although a multitude
of anonymization schemes have been proposed to release loca-
tion data, they all suer from the inherent sparseness and high-
dimensionality of location trajectories which render most tech-
niques inapplicable in practice.
In this paper, we revisit the problem of releasing location tra-
jectories with strong privacy guarantees. We propose a general
approach to synthesize location trajectories meanwhile providing
dierential privacy. We model the generator distribution of the
dataset by rst constructing a model to generate the source and
destination location of trajectories along with time information,
and then compute all transition probabilities between close loca-
tions given the destination of the synthetic trajectory. Finally, an
optimization algorithm is used to nd the most probable trajectory
between the given source and destination at a given time using
the computed transition probabilities. We exploit several inher-
ent properties of location data to boost the performance of our
model, and demonstrate its usability on a public location dataset.
We also develop a novel composite of generative neural network
to synthesize location trajectories which might be of independent
interest.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Analyzing human mobility paerns has been in the focus of re-
searchers in the last decades. Besides the fundamental academic
curiosity to beer understand human behavior[1], mining mobility
data enables us to design livable cities, buildings [2] and intelligent
transportation systems[3], perform spatial resource optimization,
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and implement location-based services [4], whether for targeted
advertisements [5], re emergency response [6] or controlling a
full-blown COVID-19 epidemic [7]. However, as the current dis-
cussion regarding contact tracing shows [8], collecting and mining
location data inherently comes with its own strong privacy and
other ethical concerns [9].
On one hand, naive de-identication methods have emerged nat-
urally, aempting to nd a feasible operating point on the privacy-
utility trade-o curve for mobility data. On the other hand, these
quasi-standard techniques do not do their job [10], and this sig-
nicantly hinders location data sharing and use by researchers,
developers and humanitarian workers alike; as evidenced by quali-
ed personnel not being granted access to mobile cell tower logs
during the height of the Ebola crisis in 20141, citing privacy as one
of the main concerns. Perhaps rightfully so, as a study showed
that pseudonymization and quasi-standard de-identication are
not sucient to prevent users from being re-identied in location
data: four spatio-temporal data points were demonstrated to be
enough for uniquely re-identifying 95% of the users in a dataset
of 1.5 million users [11]. Generally speaking, plenty of dierent
anonymization techniques have been proposed, but there exists a
similarly high number of re-identication algorithms (for a very
thorough survey see [12]).
A prominent line of anonymization research uses the notion of
dierential privacy [13] which gives a privacy guarantee based on
rigorous mathematical proofs. Some proposals based on synthetic
data generation via machine learning, i.e., modeling the dataset
through the underlying distributions of generating variables, do
apply dierential privacy specically for location data [14, 15], but
with signicant shortcomings. First, they generate synthetic traces
as random walks that do not incorporate destinations, equivalent to:
”let’s go to a place where people usually go from this place”. Second,
time-of-day is also le out from the models; clearly, this reduces
the descriptive power of the generative model as human mobility
does show strong time-of-day paerns [1]. In fact, time-of-day
even inuences trip destinations.
We acknowledge that incorporating the above variables mean-
ingfully into an anonymization algorithm (whether with or without
dierential privacy) is a hard task owing to the curse of dimen-
sionality. When trying to model a dataset through the underlying
distribution of generating variables, a general approach is to include
several dependent variables is the chain rule, i.e., the joint probabil-
ity distribution is broken down to conditional probabilities. With
the large number of conditionals in case of high-dimensional data
(such as location), the number of histograms is also large. Moreover
1hps://www.economist.com/leaders/2014/10/23/call-for-help)
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these histograms are usually very sparse, and the bins’ frequency
distribution has a heavy tail: these promote uniqueness and make
de-anonymization possible [16] as well as useful anonymization
notoriously dicult. (Note that if we assume partially independent
variables, the model loses its descriptive power: a type of dimen-
sionality vs. utility trade-o.). Yet, in specic cases, where there is
a hidden paern in the data that aids clustering, the construction of
a well-ing simple generative model could be possible. For such a
model it is reasonable to add proper noise a la dierential privacy,
and still get meaningful utility from the noisy dataset.
In order to tackle high dimensional data modelling, deep learning
has shown very promising results. Generative models estimate the
underlying distribution of the data and generate realistic samples
based on their estimated distribution. However, the generalization
capability of these models does not necessarily prevent the model
to learn any individual-specic information [17, 18]. Most privacy-
preserving algorithms for neural networks are based on modifying
the gradient information generated during backpropagation. Modi-
cation involves clipping the gradients (to bound the inuence of
any single record on the released model parameters) and adding
calibrated random noise [19, 20]. Some works propose to use gen-
erative adversarial networks (e.g., [21]) or mixture models [22] to
directly generate privacy-preserving synthetic data. Nonetheless,
none of these generative models are specic to private location
data generation.
In this paper, we propose what we believe to be the rst pri-
vate synthetic data generation algorithm and corresponding neural
network model specically tailored for mobility data.
Contributions: Our contributions are as follows:
• We propose a private synthetic data generation algorithm
that is divided into three phases. e rst phase learns the
private distribution of the (starting point, destination, time)
3-tuple. e second phase generates transition probability
distributions conditioned on the same 3-tuple. ese prob-
abilities are then used to build transition graphs, where,
in the nal step, the path with the highest probability be-
tween the starting point and destination is computed. We
combine the three steps into our nal generative model.
• Our model is conditioned on both destination and time-of-
day, and an accuracy enhancing scalable locality technique.
is trick considers only plausible places for a trajectory,
i.e., it disregards areas that are not plausible to reach in
time with a realistic speed.
• We evaluate our ndings on a real-life open source taxi
dataset, and demonstrate that the generated private syn-
thetic data has higher or the same utility compared to
previous works.
e rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 denes
the preliminaries. Section 7 gives both a high-level and a detailed
description of our generative approach. Section 8 describes the ex-
perimental evaluation including the dataset, preprocessing, model
instantiation, metrics and results. Finally, Section 9 concludes the
paper.
2 PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Location Data
In general, location data is geographical information about a spe-
cic device’s whereabouts associated to a time identier. Formally,
let L = {L1,L2, . . . ,L |L |} be the universe of locations, where |L|
is the size of the universe. We assume that the whole universe
is represented as a grid and each location corresponds to a cell
in the grid. Each record in a location database is a sequence of
timestamped location visits drawn from the universe. Specically,
a sequence S of length |S | is an ordered list of items S = (L`1 , t1) →
(L`2 , t2) → . . . → (L`|S | , t |S |), where ∀1 ≤ i ≤ |S |, L`i ∈ L.
A location may occur multiple times in S , but not consecutively.
For example, S = (L1, t1) → (L2, t2) → (L2, t3) is contracted
to S = (L1, t1) → (L2, t ′), where t ′ is a function of t2 and t3.
A location database D is composed of a multiset of sequences
D = {S1, S2, . . . , S |D |}, where |D | = N denotes the number of
traces in D.
2.2 Dierential privacy
Dierential privacy [23] (DP) ensures that the outcome of any
computation is insensitive to the change of a single record. It follows
that any information that can be learned from the database with
a record can also be learned from the one without that particular
record. In our case, DP guarantees that our generative model is
not aected by any single original trajectory beyond the privacy
budget measured by ε and δ , which can be computed as follows. e
privacy loss between two neighbouring databases can be formulated
as a random variable:
Denition 3 (Privacy loss [24]). LetM be a privacy mechanism
which assigns a value O ∈ Ranдe(M) to a dataset D. e privacy
loss of M with datasets D1 and D2 and auxiliary input aux at
output O is a random variable:
L(O;D1,D2,M,aux) = log P [M(D1,aux )=O]P [M(D2,aux )=O]
where the probability is taken on the randomness ofM.
Denition 4. (ϵ,δ )-Dierential privacy A privacy mechanism
M gives (ϵ,δ )-dierential privacy if for any database D1 and D2
diering on at most one record, and for any possible output O ∈
Ranдe(M),
Pr [M(D1) = 0] ≤ eϵ × Pr [M(D2) = 0] + δ
where the probability is taken over the randomness ofM.
e original denition does not include the term δ , this version
was introduced in [25], and allows that ϵ-dierential privacy is not
satised with probability δ .
Intuitively, the privacy loss, as a random variable, describes
the value of ϵ for a specic output O, and (ε,δ )-DP requires that
PrO∼M (D)[L(O;D1,D2,M,aux) > ε] ≤ δ for any neighboring
datasets D1 and D2. at is, DP guarantees that every output of
algorithmM is almost equally likely (up to ε) on datasets diering
in a single record except with probability at most δ , preferably
smaller than 1/|D |.
A fundamental concept for achieving dierential privacy is the
global sensitivity of a function [23] that maps an underlying data-
base to (vectors of) reals:
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Denition 5 (Global Lp -sensitivity [24]). For any function f :
D → Rd , the Lp -sensitivity of f is
∆f = maxD1,D2 | | f (D1) − f (D2)| |p
for allD1,D2 diering in at most one record, where | | · | |p denotes
the Lp -norm.
Dierential privacy also maintains composition, i.e., if each of the
mechanismsM1, . . . ,Mk is (ϵ,δ )-DP, then their k-fold adaptive
composition is (kϵ,kδ )-DP. However, a tighter upper bound can be
derived from advanced composition theorems such as in [26].
e moments accountant [19] generalizes the regular approach
of keeping track of (ϵ,δ ) using an advanced composition theorem
by taking into account the exact noise distribution. In order to
present the bounds given by the moments accountant, we rst
introduce the log of the moment generating function:
Denition 6 (MomentGenerating function). For a given mech-
anismM, the log of the moment generating function evaluated at
λ is:
αM (λ;aux ,D1,D2) = log EO∼M [exp(λL(O))].
Theorem 6.1 (Moments Accountant). Let αM (λ) be dened
as above. LetM1:k be thek-fold adaptive composition ofM1, . . . ,Mk .
en:
(1) Composability: αM1:k ≤
∑k
i=1 αMi (λ)
(2) Tail bound: For any ε > 0, the mechanismM1:k is (ϵ,δ )-
dierentially private for δ = minλ exp(αM1:k (λ) − λϵ).
6.1 Articial Neural Networks
Articial neural networks dene parametrized functions from in-
puts to outputs as compositions of many layers of basic computa-
tional blocks (articial neurons) that may apply linear or nonlinear
activation functions. By changing the parameters of these neurons,
we can t any nite set of input/output examples on the network.
Results showed that such constructed networks can approximate
arbitrary close real-valued continuous functions on compact sub-
sets of Rn [27]. In this section, we introduce the dierent types of
deep neural networks that we have applied in this work.
6.1.1 Feed Forward Neural Network (FFNN). In FFNN, neurons
(or perceptrons) are arranged into layers, where the rst layer takes
in inputs and the last layer produces outputs. e middle layers have
no connection outside the network, and hence are called hidden
layers. Each neuron in one layer is connected to every neuron
in the next layer. Hence, information is constantly ”fed forward”
from one layer to the next. In FFNN, there is no connection among
neurons in the same layer.
6.1.2 Variational Autoencoders. A variational autoencoder [28]
[29] consists of two neural networks (an encoder and a decoder),
and a loss function. e encoder compresses data into a latent
space (z) while the decoder reconstructs the data given the hidden
representation. e primary benet of a VAE is that it is capable of
learning smooth latent state representations of the input data. In
other words, a VAE learns a distribution over the input space.
Let x be a random vector of m observed variables, which are
either discrete or continuous. Let z be a random vector of n latent
continuous variables. e probability distribution between x and z
assumes the form pθ (x, z) = pθ (z)pθ (x | z), where θ indicates that
p is parametrized by θ . Also, let qϕ (z | x) be a recognition model
whose goal is to approximate the true and intractable posterior
distribution pθ (z | x). A lower-bound can be dened on the log-
likelihood of x as follows: L(x) = −DKL(qϕ (z | x) | | pθ (z)) +
Eqϕ (z |x)[logpθ (x | z)]. e rst term makes qϕ (z | x) similar to
pθ (z) ensuring that the VAE learns a decoder during training which,
at generation time, will be able to invert samples from the prior
distribution such that they look just like the training data. e
second term can be regarded as a form of reconstruction cost, and
is approximated by sampling from qϕ (z | x).
In VAEs, the gradient signal is propagated back through the sam-
pling process and through qϕ (z | x) using a reparametrization trick.
e variational autoencoder is trained using stochastic gradient
descent to optimize the loss with respect to the parameters of the
encoder and decoder, θ and ϕ.
7 MODEL
7.1 Overview
Our goal is to generate private synthetic location traces. In par-
ticular, having a location dataset D with a multiset of trajectories,
our goal is to build a generative model which approximates the
true generator distribution of D, where every trajectory in D is a
sample from this distribution. e model is built using the privacy-
sensitive data D, and hence the training process of this model must
guarantee dierential privacy for any user/trajectory in D. Due
to the large complexity of this model, we decompose it into three
main parts which are as follows:
• Trajectory Initialization: A generative model, called
Trajectory Initializer (TI), learns the underlying joint dis-
tribution of the starting and ending locations and time
variable of all trajectories, i.e., their very rst (source) and
very last (destination) location visits along with the single
timestamp of the whole trace.
• TransitionProbabilityGeneration: A classication model,
called Transition Probability Generator (TPG), learns the
transition probability distribution between any two con-
secutive locations, i.e., it outputs the probability distribu-
tion for the next hop in a trace, conditioned on the current
location, the destination and time. Both of these models
are trained with dierential privacy guarantees on a po-
tentially sensitive training dataset.
• Trace Generation: Sampling a source Lsrc and destina-
tion Ldst along with the time t from the output distribution
of TI, and using the transition probabilities between any
locations generated by TPG, the trace generator (TG) deter-
ministically reconstructs a trajectory between source Lsrc
and destination Ldst at time t . As this process only uses
the output of TI and TPG, which are already dierentially
private, and some public information about locations, the
whole generation process becomes dierentially private.
7.2 Assumptions
Time is divided into equally sized slots which are suciently large
to include whole trajectories. Each trajectory is assigned to a single
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Algorithm 1: Dierentially Private Synthetic Trace Generator
Input: Private Dataset D
1 Model construction:
2 Train the Trace Initialization Model T Iθ1 on D
3 Train the Transition Probability Generation Model T PGMθ2 on D
4 Trajectory Reconstruction:
5 for i ∈ [1, . . . , |D |] do
6 Sample (Lsrc , Ldst , t ) ∼ T Iθ1
7 Build a routing graph G(V , E), where V = L and
weiдht ((Lx , Ly )) = − logT PGθ2 [Ly |t, Lx , Ldst ], where
(Lx , Ly ) ∈ E
8 Find the path p between Lsrc and Ldst with the minimal total
weight in G
9 D′ = D′ ∪ {(p, t )}
Output: Synthetic dataset D′
time slot t , and all location visits of a trajectory take place within
this slot t . All trajectories are also assumed to be independent
of each other, that is, trajectories are generated by drawing them
independently from the same distribution.
7.3 Model Description
In the remainder of this section, we describe our general approach
to release dierentially private synthetic location trajectories that
is also summarized in Alg. 1. A more specic implementation is
detailed in Section 8.3.
7.3.1 Trajectory Initialization (TI). For every possible starting
and ending locations Lsrc ∈ L and Ldst ∈ L and time t ∈ T, the
probability distribution Pr (Lsrc ,Ldst , t) is approximated by T Iθ1 .
e model parameters θ1 are learnt from a sensitive location dataset
D, and hence the training process must be dierentially private.
e output of T Iθ1 are 3-dimensional vectors, with the starting
and ending location and time of a trace (recall each trace has a single
timestamp in our model). e set of model parameters, denoted by
θ1, depends on the exact choice of the model which is a Variational
Autoencoder in our case (see our choice in Section 8.3.1). Notice
that learning this distribution privately is challenging due to its
high dimensionality; the domain of the joint probability distribution
is |L| × |L| × |T|, where |T| is the number of all possible time slots.
We add noise to the learning algorithm (see Section 8.3.1 for more
details) so that the released model parameters θ1 are dierentially
private.
7.3.2 Transition Probability Generation (TPG). For every pos-
sible time slot t ∈ T and destination Ldst ∈ L, the true transition
distribution Pr [Lx → Ly |t ,Ldst ] is approximated with TPGθ2 for
any neighboring locations Lx and Ly , that is, the probability that an
individual at location Lx moves to location Ly towards destination
Ldst at time t .
In particular, the output ofTPGθ2 (Lx ,Ldst , t) is a neighboring lo-
cation of the current location Lx . e neighborhood is constrained
to those locations which are plausibly available from Lx in the
next time slot, that is, they are not geographically too far from it.
Although one could consider all possible locations in L as potential
next-hop locations, this would be unrealistic and also unnecessarily
degrade the performance of our model. e s-sized neighborhood of
a location Lx consists of all locations in T that are within a distance
s from Lx .
TPG, as opposed to T I , is typically a supervised classication
model; it deterministically maps a current location Lx , a destination
Ldst , and time t to a probability distribution on the set of possible
next-hop locations. is distribution is used by the Trace Generator
(TG) (see below) to nd the optimal path between a source and
a destination location at time t . Importantly, and unlike in most
Markov-based sequential data generators, our trace generator is
not restricted to choose the mode of this distribution (i.e., the most
probable next-hop location) but may consider the output which
yields the globally most probable trajectory.
During training,TPG is fed with a 3-dimensional vector as input,
which is composed of the current location, the destination location,
and time t . e output label is the next-hop location towards the
destination at time t . More specically, every trajectory (L`1 =
Lsrc ,L`2 , . . . ,L`n = Ldst ) at time t in the (private) training data is
decomposed into training samples as ((L`i ,Ldst , t),L`i+1 ) for every
0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, where L`i+1 is the output label. Note that, for every
i , L`i and L`i+1 are within distance s . We add noise to the learning
algorithm (see Section 8.3.2 for more details) so that the released
model parameters θ2 are dierentially private.
Besides the current time and destination, the prediction of the
next location depends only on the current location and not on the
earlier location visits. at is, when the next location is predicted,
we do not take into account how the current location is reached.
is is not a far-fetched simplication; several studies have shown
that 1 or at most 2-order Markov chains provide a suciently
accurate estimation of the next location visit [30].
7.3.3 Trace Generation (TG). When a trajectory is generated,
we rst sample a pair of source Lsrc and destination Ldst locations
along with the time slot t from the output distribution ofT Iθ1 . en,
a weighted directed routing graph G(V ,E) is built, where the edge
weights are the transition probabilities between two location points
generated by TPGθ2 (i.e., V = L, E is composed of all location pairs
that are within distance s , and weiдht((Lx ,Ly )) = − log Pr [Lx →
Ly |t ,Ldst ] for any (Lx ,Ly ) ∈ E). Finally, a trajectory is constructed
from graph G by applying Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm to
search for the most probable path between Lsrc and Ldst . If the
training of T Iθ1 and TPGθ2 are dierentially private, the shortest
path search in graph G is also dierentially private, since G is
constructed from the privacy-preserving outputs ofT Iθ1 andTPGθ2 .
Note that G is specic to a given destination Ldst and time slot t ,
hence dierent graphs are constructed for trajectories diering in
their destination or time. Also note that each vertex in G has at
most s neighbors which makes the search algorithm more scalable
compared to the case when G is complete (i.e., an individual can
move to any location from any location at any time).
In order to nd the most probable path between Lsrc and Ldst ,
the weight of the directed edge between any vertices Lx and Ly is
set to − logTPGθ2 [Ly |t ,Lx ,Ldst ] ≈ − log Pr [Lx → Ly |t ,Ld ], that
is the negative logarithm of the transition probability from Lx to
Ly conditioned on destination D and time t which is approximated
by model TPGθ2 . As − logTPGθ2 [Ly |t ,Lx ,Ldst ] is always non-
negative, Dijsktra’s shortest path algorithm nds the path with the
minimum total weight between two vertices, which is equivalent
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to the most probable path between Lsrc and Ldst at time t in our
case. Indeed, let P denote the set of all paths between Lsrc and
Ldst . en, the most probable path between Lsrc and Ldst is
minp∈P −∑(Lx→Ly )∈p log(TPGθ2 [Ly |t ,Lx ,Ldst ]) =
minp∈P − log(Π(Lx→Ly )∈pTPGθ2 [Ly |t ,Lx ,Ldst ]) ≈
minp∈P − log(Π(Lx→Ly )∈pPr [Lx → Ly |t ,Ldst ]) =
maxp∈P Π(Lx→Ly )∈pPr [Lx → Ly |t ,Ldst ]
due to the monotonicity property of the logarithm.
Note that the path nding algorithm is deterministic meaning
that our approach always generates the same trajectory for identical
starting and ending locations at the same time t . Although this is
hardly the case in practice, decreasing the length of time slots can
result in more realistic trajectories at the cost of model complexity.
For example, if location trajectories of vehicles are generated in a
city (see Section 8.1), then a time slot with a size of one hour can
be suciently large if trac conditions do not change signicantly
within an hour (i.e., a driver probably takes the same route between
the same source and destination locations at a given hour of the
day).
Remarks. Feeding the destination and time as an input to our
transition probability generator enhances model accuracy by a
large margin (in certain cases with more than 20%). e rationale
behind this is that the probability of the next-hop location is heavily
inuenced by the direction of movement, i.e. the specic destination
where the individual is heading for. Similarly, time also impacts the
direction of movement towards a specic destination, especially in
vehicular transport when the route of a vehicle is largely inuenced
by the trac that is ultimately time dependent. is is in sharp
contrast to earlier works [14] which solely used the last visited
locations to predict the next location of a trajectory.
Applying Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm ensures that the
synthetic traces remain realistic. Even navigation applications use
similar algorithms to select the best routes which are then faithfully
followed by most drivers in vehicular transport. Previous works
[14, 15] generated trajectories as random walks, i.e., at each location
they always choose the most likely next-hop location and stop when
a terminal symbol is chosen. ese models do not guarantee that the
generated trajectory is realistic, nor that it stops in plausible time.
Indeed, as we show in Section 8.5, our model preserves the global
statistics of trajectories (such as the distribution of trip length)
much more accurately.
8 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we empirically evaluate our model on the publicly
available San Francisco taxi dataset containing the trajectories of
dierent taxi trips [31]. We show that the synthetic trajectories
generated by our model is close to the original trajectories according
to four dierent utility metrics.
8.1 Data
e original SF taxi dataset contains a set of GPS trajectories with
timestamps that were recorded by approximately 500 taxis. ey
were collected over 30 days in the San Francisco Bay Area of the
USA in 2009. Our dataset is a random subsample containing all
the trips of 200 taxis selected randomly for our evaluation. e
trajectories cover the region of San Francisco within the bounding
box of (37.6017N, 122.5158W) and (37.8112N, 122.3527W) – approxi-
mately 9×10km2. e original sampling rate of these trajectories is
roughly 1 minute. Our goal is to preserve the privacy of passengers
and not taxi drivers, and hence a trace (or a sequence) is composed
of the recorded location visits of a single taxi trip.
8.2 Data Preprocessing
We consider two grids with two dierent cell sizes. e smaller
grid consists of cells with size of 250 × 250m2, and the larger one
with cells of size 500 × 500m2. Each GPS location point is assigned
to its covering cell. erefore, every trace (taxi trip) is composed of
the sequence of location visits, each containing a pair of cells and
the time of the visit.
All traces are dropped with velocity larger than 150 km/h (cal-
culated between two GPS points) or being out of the bounding
box. Also, we removed all traces in the weekends and US holidays
in order to focus on weekdays only. Since the sampling rate was
not constant in the database, we applied two transformations to
make it more regular; (1) cell visits are aggregated in time by 60
seconds by keeping the cell that was the most frequent in the trace
during the given time frame, and (2) when there were gaps shorter
than 5 minutes without any location visits, these missing visits are
approximated by linear interpolation. If the trace has “self-loop”
transitions (i.e., consecutive location visits with identical cells),
these visits are merged keeping the timestamp of the rst visit of
the cell. Finally, if the resulting trace had only a single visit, it is
dropped.
Aer cleansing and smoothing our data, the timestamps are
further aggregated by assigning only the hour of the day to all
visits of a single trace, when the larger part of the taxi trace was
present. For example, if a trace started at 17:58 and ended at 18:10
with 12 visits altogether, we assigned the 18th hour of the day
to every cell visit of the trace (including those which happened
before 18:00). As our aim is only to demonstrate the feasibility of
our approach, this simplication is introduced in order to lower
the size of the input and output space of our models which makes
training faster and the models less complex. Finally, we created
2-grams from the traces, i.e. we grouped every two consecutive
data points together to create a single training sample for our TPG
model, where the rst and second part are served as input and
output for the model during training. e rst part of every gram
is augmented with the destination cell of the trace where the gram
comes from, and the second gram contains only the cell identier
of the next location (without timestamp).
It is important to note that we used the whole length of the
passenger traces contrary to [14], where they were truncated to a
pre-xed size. See more descriptive statistics in Table 1. We derived
two datasets with two dierent grid sizes from the original SF taxi
dataset described in Section 8.1. e more ne-grained SF-TAXI-
250 dataset was computed using a cell size of 250 meters, whereas
SF-TAXI-500 is obtained by using a cell size of 500 meters.
8.3 Model Instantiation
As a generative model, the neural network has signicantly less
parameters than the amount of data we train them on, so the models
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Dataset |D | |L | max |t | avg |t | std.dev |t |
SF-TAXI-250 121,622 2851 69 9.07 5.15
SF-TAXI-500 120,561 848 55 7.34 4.53
Table 1: e datasets used in our experiments: SF-TAXI-250
(with a cell size of 250 meters) and SF-TAXI-500 (with a cell
size of 500 meters). Time t is always t ∈ D .
are forced to discover and eciently learn the essence of the data
in order to generate it.
8.3.1 Trajectory Initialization with Variational Autoencoders. In
order to sample a starting and ending point and time for a synthetic
trajectory, we built a dierentially private variational autoencoder
(VAE) that is capable of approximating the joint probability dis-
tribution of the three random variables. A VAE has two neural
networks; an encoder and a decoder. VAEs perform beer when the
input data is one-hot encoded, thus the input layer of the encoder
has a dimension of 2× |L| + 24, where the size of |L| depends on the
coarseness of the grid, and 24 is the number of hours in a day. We
evaluated the model with two dierently sized grids (with cell sizes
of 250 and 500 meters), see details in Table 8.5. Our encoder has two
hidden dense layers with 100 neurons each, the rst has RELU, the
second has a linear activation function. e outputs of the encoder
are the parameters of the learned normal distribution, one vector
for the expected value µ and one for the variance σ ; values drawn
from this distribution comprise the latent vectors, and we set its
size to 50 (as well as the mean and standard deviation of the normal
distribution each). e input of the decoder is a randomly chosen
sample from the normal distribution constructed by the encoder.
e decoder has to transform this latent variable to an actual ex-
ample. e decoder has only 1 hidden layer with 100 neurons and
RELU activation. Finally, there are three parallel output layers with
somax activations, each of them corresponds to an output variable
(location, destination, time). Our VAE is shown in Figure 1. VAEs
have their own specic loss function and we applied the original
one from [29].
8.3.2 Transition Probability Generation with Feed Forward Neu-
ral Networks. Our classier model is a feed forward network en-
dowed with word embedding. Its input is a 3-dimensional vector
(Lsrc ,Ldst , t) (current location, destination, time), and its output is
the probability distribution on the next hop (in Figure 2). e input
vector’s two location coordinates are fed into an embedding layer
where they are embedded separately into the same 50-dimensional
vector space2. en, they are concatenated along with the time
coordinate, resulting in a 101-dimensional vector. is serves as
the input of the next dense layer that has 200 neurons and RELU
activation. e output layer uses somax activation and has 121
classes. As explained in Section 7.3.2, the output consists of neigh-
bouring cells only: we chose to include all the cells that were at
most in a 5-cell distance from the input position, thus resulting in
2e embedding layer is inside the network, thus trained together with the rest of the
layers.
11 × 11 = 121 cells at most, where the middle cell is the input posi-
tion3. We trained the network with sparse categorical crossentropy
loss and the SGD optimizer.
Remarks. Embedding layers are mostly used in natural language
processing: they create distributional vectors that are based on the
so-called distributional hypothesis, i.e., ”words” (here locations)
appearing within similar context possess similar meaning. In case
of location data they are close to each other in geographical space
and in a trajectory, i.e., the more they tend to follow each other in
a trajectory, the closer they are in the embedded space.
e choice of a feed forward network (FFN) instead of a recurrent
neural network (such as LSTM), which has an implicit capability
to handle time and sequential data, deserves more explanation.
Training with dierentially private SGD, the training time of LSTMs
rose approximately to 6-8 times of the non-noisy model. However,
training simple feed forward networks is considerably faster, almost
as fast as the non-private model. Furthermore, our FFN has less
parameters than the simplest but still well-performing LSTM; our
solution has an accuracy only 1-2% less than the LSTM layer on
the considered datasets.
8.3.3 Privacy Parameters. For both the TI and the TPG models,
we used the Dierentially-Private Stochastic Gradient Descent (DP-
SGD) algorithm by Abadi et al. [19]. is method is independent of
the chosen loss function and model, and it adds noise to the clipped
gradients. In particular, the gradients of all model parameters in
every model update are clipped to have a bounded L2-norm with
value C , and then Gaussian noise with variance Cσ is added to the
clipped gradients before updating the parameters. e output of
DPSGD are the parameters θ1 and θ2 of TI and TPG, respectively.
e sampling probability q in DPSGD is calculated as follows. Our
aim is to provide user-level (or in our case trajectory-level) dif-
ferential privacy. However, recall that trajectories have dierent
lengths, and we divided them into 1-grams: thus there are variable
number of training examples belonging to one trajectory for TPG.
In the case of our TI model, we only have one sample per trajectory,
thus the sampling probability of a single trajectory here is at most
|B |/|D |, where |D | is the total number of trajectories and |B | is the
size of batch B. However, for TPG, a single trajectory can have
multiple samples, and therefore, we sample a batch dierently. We
rst sample a trajectory from the dataset uniformly at random, and
then a 1-gram out of this trajectory also uniformly at random. We
repeat this experiment until a batch B of grams (training samples
for TPG) is collected. is sampling mechanism ensures that any
trajectory is equally probable to participate in an update (batch),
and hence the sampling probability becomes q = |B ||D | .
8.4 Evaluation Metrics
We consider three dierent utility metrics. Each of them is evaluated
both on the synthetic and the original dataset, and the dierence is
measured according to dierent distance metrics.
Trip size distribution: e Jensen-Shannon divergence (JSD) is
computed between the distribution of the trip lengths in the syn-
thetic and the original datasets in each hour of the day (the trip
3We chose 5-cell distance, because this can cover slower and faster moving vehicles at
the same time.
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length is the number of cells of a trip). Note that, unlike the
Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence, JSD is symmetric and has a nite
value. In our case, JSD is bounded between 0 (identical distributions)
and 1 (least similar distributions).
Frequent paerns: e top-K most frequent paerns (i.e., sub-
sequences of locations) are computed both in the original D and
synthetic dataset D ′, which are denoted by FK (D) and FK (D ′), re-
spectively. e true positive ratio |FK (D)∩FK (D
′) |
K is reported for
K = 10, 20, 50, 100.
Spatio-temporal distribution of source and destination pairs: e
joint distribution of the source and destination locations is com-
puted from the original and synthetic datasets individually, and
their EMD is reported for every hour of the day. In particular, we
count the relative frequency of every possible pair of source and
destination locations in both datasets, and compute the EMD be-
tween these two distributions. e Earth Mover’s Distance [32] is
reported between these distributions, which measures their dier-
ence in terms of geographical distance (meters) and is a metric for
probability distributions (the distance between a pair of location
points is the sum of their individual distances). Specically, EMD
measures the “amount of energy” (or cost) needed to transform one
distribution to another where the ground distance is the geograph-
ical distance between the centers of cells. As the domain of this
joint distribution has a size of |L| × |L|, the computation of EMD
can be very costly. erefore, we approximate the joint distribution
by sampling at most 2000 trips from both datasets uniformly at
random, and consider only the source-destination pairs in the com-
putation that actually occur in these samples. is metric measures
the performance of the Variational Autoencoder in our proposal.
8.5 Results
In this section, we experimentally evaluate the performance of our
solution in terms of the above three utility metrics on the datasets
described in Table 1. We also evaluate the N-gram model from
[14], referred to as NGRAM in the sequel, on the same datasets
and compare the results with our work using the three metrics.
As NGRAM does not release time information, we dropped all
timestamps both in SF-TAXI-250 and SF-TAXI-500 and synthesized
the resulting datasets with NGRAM (by contrast, our approach were
always executed on the original SF-TAXI-250 and SF-TAXI-500 with
time information). Experiments were conducted using Tensorow
2.0 and Python 3.6.9. We have conducted our experiments in four
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dierent seings: we combined ϵ = 1 and ϵ = 2 with two grid
resolutions, SF-TAXI-250 and SF-TAXI-500 datasets 1.
In the TI model, we set the L2-norm clipping threshold C to 1.0,
the batch size to 200, and ran the training over 15 epochs (recall
that Cσ is the variance of the Gaussian noise used to perturb the
gradients in order to provide dierential privacy). With ϵ = 1,
σ = 1.3 and δ = 1/|D | and the learning rate is set to 0.2; with ϵ = 2,
σ is 0.9 and the learning rate is set to 0.5.
In the TPG model, we set the L2-norm clipping threshold C to
3.0, the batch size to 200, and train the model over 15 epochs. With
ϵ = 1, σ = 1.3 and δ = 1/|D |, the learning rate was set to 0.1; with
ϵ = 2, σ is 0.9 and the learning rate wis set to 0.15.
ϵ is computed with the moments accountant over 30 epochs, that
is, the total epochs trained over the whole model including TI and
TPG.
In Figure 3, we report the JSD value between the original and the
private synthetic trip size distributions with the two dierent values
of ϵ (1 and 2). Recall that the NGRAM model does not include time
information, thus we only report one value for each seing. One can
see that our model’s results are clearly much lower (i.e. closer to the
original distribution), than that of the NGRAM. e NGRAM model
generates traces without destination, and terminates whenever it
samples a special terminal character, that is, it does not select the
globally most probable trajectory. In contrast to this, our model is
more realistic.
Figure 3 also shows how the coarseness of the grid inuences
the impact of the added noise. In Figure 3a, the JSD for the two
values of ϵ have the same trend, but keep a steady distance from
each other. In contrast to this, dierent ϵ values have the same JSD
on the SF-TAXI-500 dataset in Figure 3b.
In Figure 4, the Earth Mover Distance (EMD) is reported between
the spatial distribution of the source and destination pairs depend-
ing on the time. In Figure 4a, our model has a peak between 11 a.m.
and 2 p.m., where it reports a higher EMD than the NGRAM model,
but during the rest of the day it stays steadily below that. Coars-
ening the grid does not heavily aect our model’s performance, in
general the variability is higher, but the peak is lower. However, it
does aect the NGRAM model’s performance, its EMD values drop
by a 1000 meters on average.
In Table 2 and 3, we report the results of the Frequent Paerns
metric, that is, the true positive ratio of the Top-K location subse-
quences between the original and the private synthetic databases.
One can see that for both datasets the NGRAM model clearly out-
performs our model which is due to the fact that NGRAM focuses
on the accurate release of the most frequent subsequences and
reconstructs traces from these.
As a nal result, we report the training performance metrics
aer the very last epoch for the TI and the TPG models separately
in Table 4 and 5. TPG’s accuracy is heavily dependent on the cell
size, but importantly, the error of the prediction in meters stays
low even for the higher resolution, it is only 1.4 cells on average.
9 CONCLUSIONS
Releasing location data is challenging owing to the fact that it is
high-dimensional and sparse. We proposed a novel approach to
release location data with strong privacy guarantees. In contrast to
K value (Top-K) 10 20 50 100
Our approach 50% 60% 71% 71%
NGRAM 80% 88% 100% 100%
(a) ε = 1.0
K value (Top-K) 10 20 50 100
Our approach 20% 60% 80% 80%
NGRAM 90% 90% 100% 100%
(b) ε = 2.0
Table 2: Frequent Patterns on SF-TAXI-250
K value (Top-K) value 10 20 50 100
Our approach 40% 25% 30% 22%
NGRAM 90% 95% 76% 100%
(a) ε = 1.0
K value (Top-K) value 10 20 50 100
Our approach 40% 30% 20% 15%
NGRAM 90% 95% 78% 79%
(b) ε = 2.0
Table 3: Frequent Patterns on SF-TAXI-500
ϵ value Loss
ϵ = 1 4.22
ϵ = 2 3.43
(a) SF-TAX-250
ϵ value Loss
ϵ = 1 2.50
ϵ = 2 1.00
(b) SF-TAXI-500
Table 4: Training performance of the Trajectory Initializer
aer 15 epochs.
ϵ value Loss Accuracy Error in meters
ϵ = 1 3.10 24.19% 350.40 m
ϵ = 2 2.98 26.45% 333.19 m
(a) SF-TAX-250
ϵ value Loss Accuracy Error in meters
ϵ = 1 1.42 73.52% 237.71 m
ϵ = 2 1.28 75.28% 220.26 m
(b) SF-TAXI-500
Table 5: Training performance of the Transition Probability
Generator aer 15 epochs.
most prior works, our model is capable to release time information
along with location visits without suering signicant utility loss.
Our general framework consists of generating the source and des-
tination pairs of every trace separately, computing the transition
probabilities between neighboring locations, and then generating
synthetic trajectories between the source and destination using
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a graph optimization algorithm. As opposed to previous works,
the transition probability depends on the time and the destina-
tion towards where the individual is moving, and is computed only
between geographically close locations which make our solution ac-
curate and scalable. We evaluated our proposal on a public location
dataset and designed neural networks to model the distribution of
trajectories. ese networks are simple and hence fast to train even
with dierential privacy guarantees. Our approach is evaluated
on real-life location data of taxi passenger trajectories, and results
show that the provided utility is meaningful. erefore, our tech-
nique can be a compelling new approach to the privacy-preserving
release of location trajectories with time information. Importantly,
we produce synthetic datasets that hopefully preserve many dif-
ferent statistics of the original dataset. Obviously, releasing only a
few targeted statistics with or without dierential privacy, instead
of the complete synthetized dataset, is a dierent approach which
should always result in greater accuracy but only with respect to
the released statistics.
ere are several further research directions to explore. First,
the proposed framework is general and nding the best generative
models to a given type of data is dicult which requires domain
expertise. Second, there can be several techniques to recover tra-
jectories from the noisy transition probabilities which may provide
superior performance to a simpler shortest path search. Finally, our
general approach may be applicable to other types of sequential
data than location trajectories such as dierent time series.
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